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Article
Proponents of partisan influence in Congress (e.g., Aldrich 
and Rohde 2000; Cox and McCubbins 2005, 2007; Rohde 
1991) believe that legislative outcomes can be manipulated 
for both electoral and policy benefits. Generally, these 
scholars argue that party organizations have two ways of 
manipulating these outcomes—negative and positive 
agenda control. The former often entails keeping divisive 
legislative proposals off the agenda, especially if party 
leaders suspect that they will lose (Cox and McCubbins 
2005; Gailmard and Jenkins 2007; Jenkins and Monroe 
2012a). Positive agenda control, on the other hand, typi-
cally entails arm-twisting, vote buying, or other aggressive 
tactics associated with whipping individual legislators 
(Finocchiaro and Rohde 2008; Rohde 1991). These strate-
gies help to ensure that the majority party is disproportion-
ally successful in obtaining their desired policy outcomes.
Underlying these theories is the assumption that the 
rank-and-file will vote with the party leadership on 
important agenda-setting votes to promote the desired 
outcome. More specifically, cartel theory states, “. . . car-
tel members expect rank-and-file members to support the 
agenda-setting decisions . . .” and “. . . the cartel’s leader-
ship takes action to maintain cooperation and coordina-
tion within the cartel” (Cox and McCubbins 2005, 24). To 
date, party theorists have done an excellent job describing 
the macro-level concepts and rationale behind why par-
ties seek to influence procedural votes in Congress. 
However, there has been less research on how the leader-
ship goes about the day-to-day task of coordinating with 
the rank-and-file to assure the desired outcomes on 
agenda-setting procedural votes.
In this article, we introduce an original dataset of 
emails sent from the Democratic Majority Leader’s office 
that signal the leadership’s positions on upcoming legis-
lation and floor votes during the 110th and 111th 
Congresses. These emails provide direct evidence of how 
the party tries to maintain coordination among the rank-
and-file and, more importantly, which votes the leader-
ship views as important for setting the procedural table. 
We can then test hypotheses related to which members of 
the rank-and-file will support the leadership when asked 
to do so. Our results indicate that responsiveness to party 
signals is not uniformly concentrated among majority 
party members; rather, it varies across the ideological 
spectrum of the majority caucus.
The organization of the article is as follows. In the 
next section, we review the literature on agenda control 
and party influence in Congress. We then place what we 
call “signaling” in the broader institutional and proce-
dural context and discuss how it can facilitate party lead-
ers’ goals. We next introduce the data used in our analysis, 
particularly as it pertains to how the party leadership sets 
the agenda on procedural matters. We present descriptive 
evidence before turning to more systematic analysis of 
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how often legislators vote with the leadership on signaled 
votes. The final section concludes and discusses the 
implications of our findings.
Theories of Partisan Influence in 
Congress
The past two decades has witnessed an explosion in the 
growth of scholarship detailing the influence of political 
parties in Congress. Initially, students of congressional 
politics set out to address the resurgence in parties after a 
substantial decline in the preceding decades (see, for 
example, Rohde 1991). Soon thereafter, Krehbiel (1993) 
challenged this view of parties by arguing that for party 
influence to be significant, it must be documented inde-
pendently of legislators’ own personal preferences. In 
response to this challenge issued by Krehbiel, numerous 
attempts were made in the ensuing years to demonstrate 
that parties do independently influence legislative out-
comes in Congress (see, for example, Aldrich and Rohde 
2000; Binder, Lawrence, and Maltzman 1999; Evans and 
Grandy 2009).
During the last decade, emphasis has gradually shifted 
away from the question of whether parties matter in 
Congress to a broader, theoretical examination of how 
parties influence policy outcomes. Cox and McCubbins 
(2005) argue the majority party’s primary source of influ-
ence is through negative agenda control. Specifically, the 
majority party will block “bad” legislation, or amend-
ments, from coming to the floor if such legislation is 
likely to split or highlight divisions within the party. This 
is often accomplished through the practice of using 
restrictive rules issued by the Rules Committee (Marshall 
2005; Monroe and Robinson 2008).
Nevertheless, the very nature of the legislative process 
dictates that controversial policies must be voted on in 
Congress from time to time to bolster the party’s record 
of accomplishments. To ensure success on divisive issues, 
party leaders seek near unanimous support on procedural 
matters that dictate the manner in which controversial 
bills are debated and considered on the floor. These pro-
cedural factors are less visible to constituents for the pur-
poses of reelection (Arnold 1990) but are essential to the 
party for ensuring legislative passage (Cox and Poole 
2002; Finocchiaro and Rohde 2008).
Recent work has confirmed the theoretical intuition 
that these procedural votes are of the highest priority to 
party organizations. Snyder and Groseclose (2000), for 
example, find that party pressure is elevated on proce-
dural and platform-type votes.1 Cox and Poole (2002) 
also find increased party effects on procedural votes—
such as votes on special rules or chamber organization. 
Crespin (2010) and Jenkins, Crespin, and Carson (2005) 
show that members are responsive to party pressure on 
procedural votes under varying circumstances. In addi-
tion, Roberts (2005) finds elevated party pressure on 
another procedural tool, the motion to recommit.
The theory underlying increased party pressure on 
procedural votes is twofold. First, as discussed above, 
these votes are extremely important to the party. They 
allow the majority to bring certain issues to the floor, 
regulate the scope of the substance under consideration, 
and control the length and nature of the debate. This has 
important implications for both policy output and elec-
tioneering. Second, scholars note that procedural votes 
lack the “traceability” of amendment or final passage 
votes (Arnold 1990). Thus, constituents are less likely to 
punish members for supporting the party’s position on a 
procedural matter (Arnold 1990; Cox and McCubbins 
2005, 2007; Jenkins and Monroe 2012a, 2012b; Monroe 
and Robinson 2008).
Despite this apparent lack of traceability, recent work 
has demonstrated that party unity on procedural votes is 
by no means guaranteed and support by all rank-and-file 
members is not unconditional. Finocchiaro and Rohde 
(2008) report that the majority party was occasionally 
“rolled” on votes to adopt special rules (on this point, see 
also Carson, Monroe, and Robinson 2011), concluding 
that the majority must use some positive agenda control 
techniques on these procedural votes.2 While constituents 
may not be able to trace voting on procedure with policy 
outcomes, Smith, Ostrander, and Pope (2013) find that 
opponents are just as likely to exploit a senators’ vote on 
a procedural matter as they are a substantive vote. There 
is anecdotal evidence that House candidates will run ads 
attacking incumbents for voting with the leadership at 
high rates even if many of those votes are procedural in 
nature.3 In sum, while the evidence suggests greater party 
influence on procedural matters, little systematic research 
examines the micro-level factors associated with how 
party leaders seek to specifically manipulate procedural 
outcomes or which types of procedural votes the party 
will seek to influence. Finally, while the literature shows 
the majority rarely loses on procedural votes, support is 
not unconditional, and it does not delve into detail on 
which members are most likely to support the party when 
asked.
Partisan Influence and Procedural 
Signaling
In the following section, we develop expectations about 
when the majority party will ask for support on agenda-
setting votes and then who we think is likely to respond. 
We call this ask a “signal” to differentiate from whipping 
because, to us, the processes are distinct from one 
another. As Evans and Grandy (2009) assert, the whip 
system in Congress is used largely to facilitate the 
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passage of legislation, especially when legislators are 
wavering in their support of key tenants of the majority’s 
agenda. Legislators within this system convey informa-
tion to leaders and try to build consensus to ensure that 
rank-and-file members fall in line on tough votes. 
However, the whip system is not the only organization 
that sends voting preferences to the rank-and-file. The 
Majority Leader’s office, which is concerned with sched-
uling votes (Oleszek 2013), is also an important player in 
the legislative process. This procedure is somewhat dif-
ferent though because the Leader’s office does not appear 
to collect vote preferences the way the whip does, and 
the process does not allow for time to build consensus. 
We will discuss the specific mechanism by which the 
leadership signals the rank-and-file when we introduce 
our data.
When to Signal
Building off of the preceding discussion, we believe the 
party is more likely to signal its position on certain types 
of procedural votes for several reasons. First, procedural 
votes can be confusing to some legislators. Many rules 
are technical in nature and the party will often provide as 
much guidance as possible to alleviate problems associ-
ated with information asymmetry when it comes to vot-
ing on them. Second, procedural matters govern the 
manner in which a bill is debated, amended, and consid-
ered on the floor. By dictating the amendment process, 
rules have the ability to centralize proposal power under 
the majority party leadership. In other words, they allow 
the leadership to determine what gets voted upon on the 
floor and what does not (Cox 2000; Cox and McCubbins 
2005; Rohde 1991; Smith 1989). As a result, this can be 
controversial for majority party members across the ideo-
logical spectrum.
Votes on procedure are occasionally more controver-
sial than votes on substance. During consideration of 
H.R. 4853, the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance 
Reauthorization and Job Creation Act of 2010, for 
instance, the Rules Committee produced a closed rule (H. 
Res. 1745) that barred all amendments.4 Predictably, 
minority party Republicans were united in their opposi-
tion to the rule, and Minority Leader John Boehner 
(R-OH) went so far as to deem it “chicken crap” (Sloan 
2010). However, the rule also sparked dissension from 
majority party moderates who sought to offer amend-
ments cutting taxes. Ultimately, H. Res. 1745 passed 213-
203, with thirty majority party Democrats voting against 
it. The bill itself was actually adopted by a more comfort-
able margin, passing 234-188.
As H. Res. 1745 suggests, not all procedural votes are 
created equal. We anticipate the majority party would be 
more likely to call for support on special rule votes and 
motions to order the previous question on special rules 
than other types of procedural motions. This, we believe, 
is a result of a combination of importance and timing. 
Because the majority party controls the Rules Committee, 
leaders are aware of the content of the rule reported by 
the committee. In addition, special rules are written rela-
tively quickly prior to floor consideration so the rank-
and-file may not have time to study them before they 
come to a vote. Failure to adopt the rule can result in the 
defeat of the underlying bill or substantial policy conces-
sions. In addition, while the House often orders the previ-
ous question on the rule (cutting off debate to vote on the 
motion) without objection, there will occasionally be a 
roll-call vote taken on it. Defeating the previous question 
motion allows the minority to amend a rule, and a defeat 
is devastating to majority party agenda control. Once the 
previous question motion is ordered, a vote is taken on 
the rule itself. Given the important consequences that the 
failure of these motions could have—coupled with the 
fact that the majority leadership is aware of their content 
and timing ahead of time—we anticipate the party is 
likely to signal its position on these matters.5
The importance of timing and content is made even 
clearer when one considers another key type of proce-
dural vote: the motion to recommit. While scholars have 
confirmed the important role the motion to recommit can 
play (Krehbiel and Meirowitz 2002; Roberts 2005), its 
quick introduction should limit the majority party’s abil-
ity to effectively signal on it. The motion to recommit can 
only be offered by an opponent of a bill at the conclusion 
of debate. A motion to recommit with instructions that the 
committee report forthwith ensures the bill does not leave 
the floor and essentially provides the minority with an 
opportunity to offer an amendment of its choosing. A 
straight motion to recommit sends the bill back to the par-
ent committee essentially killing the bill (Oleszek 2013). 
The motion is the prerogative of the minority party and is 
not provided with much notice to members, and the oppo-
sition does not have to give the proponents time to study 
any substantive changes that may result if the motion 
passes.
Republicans used the motion to recommit to frustrate 
majority party Democrats during the 110th Congress. As 
Oleszek (2013, 189) notes,
In the 2007-2008 period, Republicans artfully crafted 
recommit motions to attract support from Democrats elected 
from conservative districts. The result: they won adoption of 
the recommit motion twenty-five times compared to only 
fourteen agreed to when Democrats for a dozen years were 
the minority.
This led Democrats to alter rules governing the motion 
during the 111th Congress.6 Because the motion is not 
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provided in advance, the majority party has limited 
opportunities to signal its opposition or support of it. 
Even if they had time to study the motion, they may not 
want to signal because a vote on the motion to recommit 
can be interpreted as voting on substance rather than pro-
cedure. While the motion often includes an amendment 
that may be difficult for majority party members to 
oppose, occasionally motions to recommit include sub-
stantive or technical amendments majority party leaders 
may support.7 For other procedural motions—like the 
motion to table—the timing and importance of the motion 
will vary on a case-by-case basis. As such, signaling 
should be observed, though less regularly then we would 
anticipate on special rules votes.
Who Will Respond?
In the event the majority party does issue a signal, which 
members are most likely to respond favorably? While the 
majority party wants to win, it frequently does not need 
its entire membership to fall in line to do so. Moreover, 
the party leadership is preoccupied with maintaining its 
majority status, and doing so occasionally requires pla-
cating representatives who represent cross-pressured dis-
tricts (Arnold 1990).8 To maximize the likelihood the 
party will win while minimizing its loss of seats, the party 
leadership must be strategic in choosing when to pressure 
members on controversial legislation or key votes. Thus, 
when the party leadership finds it has more votes than 
necessary to pass a measure (or realizes that it does not 
have enough votes to be successful), it will release extra-
neous, cross-pressured members to vote with their con-
stituencies. Otherwise, these legislators might find it 
difficult to support the party position on controversial 
legislation (King and Zeckhauser 2003).
Thus, we anticipate that while party leaders will talk 
tough on procedural votes, they will be most tolerant of 
defections from cross-pressured members—those who 
are generally positioned closer to the floor median. For 
example, in 2008, House Appropriations Chairman David 
Obey (D-WI) canceled a meeting with constituents from 
the office of Rep. Charlie Melancon (D-LA). Melancon 
defected on a vote to order the previous question on a 
special rule the day before, leading Obey to tell the party 
caucus that “anybody who wants to routinely vote against 
the leadership on procedural grounds, don’t ask me to see 
their visiting firemen when they’re in town” (Soraghan 
2008). While the implication was that Melancon’s con-
stituents were not going to be able to meet with Obey 
(and thus be denied an opportunity to request a favorable 
earmark), Obey eventually relented and held the meeting 
the next day.
The expectation that more extreme majority party 
members are most likely to be influenced by partisan 
signaling from the leadership is consistent with recent 
work by Minozzi and Volden (2013), who examine roll-
call votes with highly partisan elements. They report that 
members most likely to heed the call of the party are 
those “whose preferences most align with the party and 
who benefit the most from a strong, unified voice for 
their party” (Minozzi and Volden 2013, 799). Extremists 
benefit more than moderates from a strong, unified party 
brand and from keeping majority control of the chamber. 
They are also more likely to be in a safe electoral posi-
tion and could absorb the costs of casting a party-line 
vote compared with more moderate members of the 
caucus.
Given what we know from the literature and our own 
observations of the House, we offer several hypotheses 
regarding the effect of party signals. First, if these sig-
nals carry any weight, we expect to find members sup-
porting the leaderships’ position more on signaled votes 
compared with non-signaled votes. This will provide 
some evidence that the signals are working. Second, as 
discussed above, we can also determine whether all 
members of the party vote in lock step with the leader-
ship on agenda-setting votes when asked or if there is 
variation across different types of members based on 
their degree of liberalness. We expect to find the most 
liberal representatives rarely face this dilemma because 
the positions of their constituents and party are most 
likely similar. For more moderate representatives, they 
may feel cross-pressured from time to time and occa-
sionally not support the signaled party position. The 
most conservative members of the Democratic Party are 
frequently put in a position where the views of their con-
stituents are not the same as the leadership. In addition, 
conservative Democrats might actually pursue a delib-
erative strategy of voting against the leadership when 
they can to lower party support scores. This will help 
them avoid situations where opponents can run ads 
against them playing up how often they voted with 
Nancy Pelosi. Taken together, we expect liberals to 
respond to signals at high rates, moderates at lower rates, 
and conservatives not at all.
To summarize, we have expectations that the Leader’s 
office will be more likely to signal on procedural, as 
opposed to substantive votes, because they are largely 
concerned with scheduling. In addition, they should sig-
nal on important procedural votes where they have 
enough time to formulate a party position (i.e., votes on 
special rules and previous question motions on special 
rules). We have argued that signaled votes should be 
more likely to attract party support than non-signaled 
votes and that extremists should be most responsive. In 
the next section, we show how the majority leadership 
uses emails to deliver floor updates on upcoming proce-
dural votes in Congress.
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Leader’s Floor Updates
To examine how the majority party instructs members on 
procedural votes, we use a new dataset that consists of the 
Democratic Leader’s floor update emails for the second 
session of the 110th Congress and the entire 111th 
Congress.9 The majority leader’s office sends these 
updates to Democratic members and their staff while 
Congress is in session multiple times throughout the 
day.10 Generally, there is a morning email (separate from 
the Daily Leader) that describes the legislative agenda for 
the day. Then, as votes approach, the office sends out 
additional emails, sometimes only minutes before the 
votes take place. On some votes, the emails provide sim-
ple instructions, or “signals,” such as vote yes or no. For 
amendments, the emails frequently give a one or two sen-
tence description of the substance of the amendment. The 
emails will often give warnings that the Republicans 
might offer dilatory motions such as the motion to adjourn 
or force a vote on approval of the House journal.
Figure 1 provides an example of one email with sig-
nals. For two votes, the motion to adjourn and the special 
rule, there are instructions to vote yes. For the two sub-
stantive votes, there are no instructions. In contrast to 
emails sent from the whip’s office, the majority leader 
only sends signals on select votes. This suggests the lead-
ers’ emails are likely serving as a proxy for how salient 
the vote is to the majority, and as such, highlighting votes 
that are likely accompanied by positive agenda control 
techniques.
Table 1 provides a breakdown of the different types of 
votes taken by the House and the proportion of the time 
the party offered instructions.11 It is clear from the table 
that the party gives the majority of instructions on proce-
dural votes while only offering a few instructions on sub-
stantive votes. In fact, the Majority Leader rarely provided 
instructions on the final passage of a bill or conference 
report.
Within the procedure category, as expected, the lead-
ership frequently gives instructions on two types of 
important positive agenda-setting votes—moving the 
question on a special rule and then the vote on the rule. As 
noted above, it is essential that the party win on these 
votes, especially moving the previous question, because 
a loss can concede agenda-setting powers to the minor-
ity party. Instructions were commonly provided on 
motions to adjourn because losing this vote could shut 
down the session prematurely if offered by the minority 
Republicans, or cause the House to stay in session beyond 
a desired date when the motion is put forward by the 
majority party. In addition, the leadership frequently, but 
not always, supplied instructions on motions to table. 
Generally, a motion to table is used to dispense with 
other motions that might force the majority to take an 
uncomfortable vote. Finally, despite their importance, 
leaders rarely signaled the parties’ position on the motion 
to recommit. Again, we feel this is largely due to the tim-
ing behind the motion to recommit.
Preliminary Findings
The next question we consider is the extent to which sig-
nals, such as an email from the majority leader, can mat-
ter. If they are at all effective, we should find a greater 
proportion of Democrats support the party on votes with 
instructions compared with votes without instructions. To 
test this hypothesis, we created two measures. The first is 
the proportion of time a member followed the signals, 
and the second is how often they voted with the party on 
non-signaled votes. In both categories, we only include 
procedural votes to increase comparability across the two 
measures. If we were to include final passage votes, they 
would almost all fall into the non-signaled category and 
certainly bias results toward lower levels of party support 
on non-signaled votes.12
To measure the party position on votes without sig-
nals, we initially compared how the majority leader, 
Steny Hoyer, and the majority whip, James Clyburn, 
voted. If they both voted the same way, we used that posi-
tion as the party position. If they differed, or one of them 
did not vote, we coded the way the majority of the party 
voted as the party position.13 While the measures had a 
high of 1 for both Congresses, the minimum signaled 
vote proportion was .61 in the 110th Congress (Nick 
Lampson—Texas) and .29 in the 111th (Walt Minnick—
Idaho). Lampson also had the low score for non-signaled 
votes in the 110th Congress (.58) while Bobby Bright 
(AL-2) supported the party 44 percent of the time in the 
111th Congress.
We created Figures 2 and 3 to compare how members 
vote with different measures of preferences. They present 
four scatterplots of our party support measures plotted 
against two variables, a member’s W-nominate score 
(Poole and Rosenthal 2007) and the Democratic share of 
the presidential vote in their congressional district. In 
both figures, the closed circles are the scores for signaled 
votes while the open circles are for non-signaled votes. 
We also plotted simple Lowess curves to indicate the gen-
eral trends in the data and put in vertical lines to denote 
the party and chamber median. It is clear from all the fig-
ures that the overall levels of party support are generally 
high across both types of votes. Party support for signaled 
votes (dashed lines) tends to be slightly higher across 
most of the variation in the x axes, but not all of it, with 
support dropping off as members move from the party 
median toward the chamber median and beyond. Because 
W-nominate and presidential vote run in opposing direc-
tions, we call all members to the liberal side of the party 
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Figure 1. Example of floor update.
median “liberals,” between the party median and the 
chamber median “moderates,” and on the opposite of the 
chamber median “conservatives.” We picked these posi-
tions to test our hypotheses about who responds to signals 
because they are frequently important in relevant theories 
of legislative organization.
In Figure 2, we see that party support on signaled 
votes is nearly perfect for liberals for the 110th and the 
111th Congresses. The pattern is similar, although at 
slightly lower rates for non-signaled votes. For moderate 
members, support is still high on both sets of votes, but 
the general trend is downward with a greater drop-off in 
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the 111th Congress. For conservatives on the far side of 
the chamber median, the support is lower still. We also 
see the difference between the two categories declines 
and even crosses for a few members. We should be cau-
tious, though, in drawing inferences about differences 
between groups in this last category due to the nature of 
Lowess curves and lack of statistical hypotheses tests. In 
Figure 3, the patterns appear to be generally similar with 
members from districts with a large Democratic base sup-
porting the party at extremely high rates, a small drop-off 
for representatives between the two medians, and then a 
larger decline on the other side of the chamber median.
These figures offer what we think are some interesting 
preliminary findings. First, they show that the signals 
from the Majority Leader’s office are effective as mem-
bers appear to support the party at higher levels when 
they receive a signal. Second, they demonstrate that not 
all members support the party on procedural votes. This 
is an especially interesting result as much of the Congress 
literature to date has generally assumed that members of 
the majority party will simply vote with the party on pro-
cedural votes to facilitate control of the agenda. Although 
“enough” members support the party, some do not, even 
when asked.
Table 1. Vote Types by Congress.
110th Congress 111th Congress
Vote type Total votes % instructions Total votes % instructions
Substantive and suspensions
 Final passage of a bill 45 101 3.0
 Final passage of conference report 4 12 8.3
 Final passage of resolution 2 5 60.0
 Final passage of joint resolution 3  
 Passage of a bill under suspension of the rules 133 304 0.3
 Passage of a joint resolution under suspension of 
the rules
2 3  
 Final passage of concurrent resolution 7 14.3 18 72.2
 Passage of a concurrent resolution under 
suspension of the rules
18 39  
 Passage of a resolution under suspension of the 
rules
86 347  
 Straight amendments 82 359 6.1
 Passage over presidential veto 5 20.0  
 Motion to suspend the rules and concur 6 14  
Procedural
 Motion to reconsider 16  
 Appeal of the Chair’s ruling 2 50.0  
 Motion to recommit to conference 1 2 100
 Motion to rise from the committee of the whole 3 100.0 1  
 Passage of special rule 65 80.0 132 92.4
 Motion to commit 3 33.3
 Motion to consider 5 100.0 7 85.7
 Motion to refer 2 8 87.5
 Motion to order previous question 1 4 75.0
 Election of speaker 1  
 Motion to recommit 35 65 12.3
 Motion to instruct conferees 10 11  
 Motion to table 38 65.8 35 80.0
 Motion to recede and concur 16 40 32.5
 Previous question on special rules 68 82.4 69 92.8
Dilatory
 Motion to approve house journal 13 92.3 13 100.0
 Motion to adjourn 39 79.5 19 63.2
 Miscellaneous (non-dilatory) 14 14.3
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In Table 2, we perform a series of difference of 
means tests to determine if members are more likely to 
vote with the party on procedural votes when they 
receive instructions. During the 110th Congress, 
Democrats voted with the party at a rate of .981 when 
there were instructions and .949 otherwise. For the 
111th Congress, the difference was even larger, 4.8 
(.946 vs. .898). These differences, along with a t test 
when we pool the observations, are significant at the 
.05 level. Although the differences appear small, a dif-
ference of one percent of the Democratic majority cor-
responds to roughly 2.3 votes in the 110th Congress and 
2.5 in the 111th Congress. Substantively, this means an 
average of 9.6 more Democrats voted with their party 
on procedural votes when the Leader’s office gave 
instructions and indicates that instructions are effective 
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Figure 3. Proportion of leadership support by presidential vote.
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and may mean the difference between winning or los-
ing on an extremely close vote.
We also examine differences across three groups—lib-
erals, moderates, and conservatives based of off 
W-nominate scores. Liberal Democrats appear to vote 
with the party on signaled votes nearly unconditionally, at 
a rate of .994 compared with .949 on non-signaled votes. 
For moderates between the medians, the difference is 
similar (.04), but the overall rates are a few points lower. 
These two differences are also statistically significant. 
Finally, when we examine the most moderate members, 
their support plummets below .80, although the differ-
ence between signaled and non-signaled votes is not sig-
nificant. This finding helps to confirm the theoretical 
argument that moderates may be less responsive to the 
needs of the party when they come at the expense of their 
constituency (Mayhew 1974) and may not “heed the call 
of party” when called (Minozzi and Volden 2013). Taken 
together, these results are consistent with Finocchiaro and 
Rohde (2008) who find that member support of the party 
on procedural votes is clearly conditional. The difference 
here is we examine individual members rather than par-
ticular votes.
Results
To determine whether our results hold up to systematic 
scrutiny, we estimate several models where the depen-
dent variable is measured the same as above—the propor-
tion of the time a member votes with the party on signaled 
and also non-signaled roll calls. Because our dependent 
variable is a proportion, we estimate a generalized linear 
model (GLM) with a logit link and the binomial family.14 
To test whether there is a difference between the two, we 
include a dichotomous variable, signaled, that is coded 
one for each members’ signaled vote score and zero for 
non-signaled votes.15 In additional estimations, we test 
several hypotheses about where support is high and where 
it drops off.
In addition to the signaled variable, we include a few 
control variables in our model. We expect members from 
districts with a strong Democratic base should vote with 
the party more often, all else equal. This conjecture holds 
for two reasons. First, a Democrat with a strong base does 
not always have to decide between voting with her dis-
trict and voting with the party. On most votes, the two 
positions are similar enough that when a member votes 
with the party, she is also voting with her constituents. 
However, members who represent districts with a smaller 
Democratic base are often forced to cast votes that either 
support the party or the voters back home (but not both). 
Second, we also expect that the amount of Democratic 
support in the district and a member’s electoral safety 
should be highly correlated. As such, members from 
strong Democratic districts can support the party more 
often, even if it means occasionally voting against the 
district, and still feel secure about returning to Congress 
year after year (on this point, see Carson et al. 2010). We 
measure Democratic base as the Democratic presidential 
candidate’s share of the two-party vote in the election 
prior to the respective Congress.
We also expect that candidates who faced a primary 
challenge could support the party differently compared 
with legislators who did not have to contend for their 
party’s nomination. Depending on if the challenge is from 
the left or the right, the representative may support the 
party at higher or lower rates. If a member has to worry 
about a challenge from within her own party, she needs to 
be particularly careful not to stray from the district’s 
views on the issues. While most constituents do not 
routinely pay attention to procedural votes, a primary 
challenger will likely use a high (or low) party support 
score as a way to show the member is out of touch with 
the district. To measure this concept, we include a 
dichotomous variable, Primary Challenge, coded one 
for members who faced a primary challenger and zero 
otherwise.16
In addition, we include a dichotomous variable, 
Freshman, to determine whether freshman members are 
more or less likely to support the party leadership. From 
one perspective, it would make sense for freshmen to be 
more deferential to the party given that they are new to 
the job and often must seek guidance elsewhere in terms 
of how to vote (Kingdon 1989). Members in the party 
leadership provide a good source for cues in this sense 
and can often reward loyal freshmen with campaign 
money for their next election (Cann 2008). An alternative 
perspective emphasizes the individual ideological quali-
ties of those legislators. In the 110th and 111th Congresses, 
the Democratic Party saw an influx of members from 
more conservative House districts, which could result in 
an increased propensity for member defections among 
these freshmen legislators. Finally, we also include a 
Table 2. Proportion Voting with Leadership on Procedural 
Votes.
Vote type
All groups Signaled Non-signaled Difference
110th Congress .981 .949 0.032*
111th Congress .946 .898 0.048*
Pooled .963 .922 0.040*
By group
 Liberal .994 .949 0.045*
 Moderate .976 .936 0.040*
 Conservative .789 .770 0.019
*Difference significance at p < .05.
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dichotomous variable coded one for the 110th Congress 
to account for differences between the two congresses.
We present the results from the initial estimation in the 
columns labeled “Base Model” in Table 3. To provide a 
substantive interpretation of our hypotheses, we calculate 
first differences in the change of the proportion of party 
support for key variables. These numbers appear in 
brackets in Table 3. In the base model, we continue to 
find that members vote with the party at greater propor-
tions (.045) when the party sends a simple signal in an 
email. The control variables work as we expected as 
members with a larger Democratic base vote with the 
party at higher levels. Representatives who faced a pri-
mary challenge and freshman were also less likely to toe 
the party line. In addition, we created Figure 4, which 
provides a predicted measure of mean party support for 
both types of votes over the range of our Democratic 
Base variable. The dashed line is for signaled votes, while 
the solid line is for non-signaled votes. In both cases, the 
shaded areas represent 95 percent confidence intervals. In 
line with our theoretical expectations, we find the support 
for signaled votes to be higher with relatively low levels 
from the most conservative districts and much higher 
support as districts become more liberal. The difference 
is not significant at the highest levels, but this is because 
both predicted proportions are near the maximum of one. 
While the difference is significant for relatively conser-
vative members, this figure represents average effects 
and is not a direct test of our group hypotheses. We will 
turn to that next.
In the following estimation, which only includes sig-
naled votes in the dependent variable, we include dichot-
omous variables for two of the three groups—liberal and 
moderate—and leave the conservative group as the 
reference category. This allows us to test for differences 
between the different types of members when the leader-
ship sends a signal. The coefficients on the Liberal and 
Moderate variables are positive and significant indicating 
the level of support for these groups is statistically greater 
compared with the reference category. Similar to the 
results in Table 2, the proportion of support for the party 
is greatest for the most liberal grouping of members. A 
Wald test indicates that the difference between the liberal 
and moderate groups is also statistically significant at the 
.01 level. When we only examine signaled votes, liberal 
Table 3. GLM Estimation of Party Support.
Base model Groups (signaled only) Liberal Moderate Conservative
Variables
Coefficient 
(SE)
Marginal  
effect
Coefficient 
(SE)
Marginal  
effect
Coefficient 
(SE)
Marginal  
effect
Coefficient 
(SE)
Marginal  
effect
Coefficient 
(SE)
Marginal 
effect
Signaled 
vote
0.80* (0.083) 0.031 [0.045]a 2.19* (0.10) 0.044 [0.050]a 1.03* (0.075) 0.037 [0.050]a 0.12 (0.10) 0.019 [0.011]a
Democratic 
base
5.06* (0.58) 0.19 4.12*(0.94) 0.056 −0.80* (0.31) −0.014 1.84* (0.46) 0.063 6.22* (1.21) 1.03
Primary 
challenge
−0.056 (0.10) −0.0022 0.18 (0.19) 0.0023 −0.10 (0.11) −0.0018 −0.13 (0.16) −0.0048 0.29* (0.13) 0.046
Freshman −0.59* (0.11) −0.027 −0.30* (0.15) −0.0045 −0.11 (0.091) −0.0020 −0.22* (0.11) −0.0083 −0.34* (0.15) −0.057
110th 
Congress
1.07* (0.076) 0.042 0.99* (0.14) 0.014 0.49* (0.056) 0.0082 1.00* (0.079) 0.036 0.94* (0.16) 0.14
Liberal 2.65* (0.26) 0.046 [0.130]a  
Moderate 1.83* (0.17) 0.023 [0.116]a  
Constant −0.66 (0.35) −0.67 (0.46) 3.29* (0.22) 1.34* (0.25) −1.70* (0.55)  
N 986 493 492 376 118  
AIC 0.32 0.21 0.21 0.29 0.82  
Standard errors clustered by member in parentheses; AIC = Akaike information criterion.
aFirst difference holding all other variables at means or modes.
*p < .05.
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votes: base model.
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members show a first difference increase of support of 
.130 compared with .116 for the moderate category.
Finally, we estimate three additional models using just 
the members in each of the groups.17 Now, the signal 
variable tells us if representatives in each of the groups 
are supporting the party at higher levels when a signal is 
sent by the Leader. Members in the liberal and middle 
groups appear to be responsive to signals on procedural 
votes, increasing their support at similar levels. Although 
the first differences are nearly identical, there is not much 
room for improvement for the most liberal group as they 
are starting from a much higher baseline. For the mem-
bers on the other side of the floor median, they show no 
difference when a signal is sent. Figure 5 plots the mean 
predicted party support score over the range of the 
Democratic Base variable with 95 percent confidence 
intervals in the shaded region. It shows us that the support 
on signaled votes is near 1 for liberals and significantly 
lower (although still high) for non-signaled votes. The 
results are similar for moderates with increasing support 
across the range. Finally, there is no difference between 
the two types of votes for members in the conservative 
category.
The controls also vary across the three groups in sub-
stantively interesting ways. The Democratic Base coeffi-
cient is now negative and small for the liberal group, 
positive and slightly larger for the middle group, and 
even larger for the right group. This large coefficient for 
the conservative group means that moderate members are 
very responsive to changes in their base, while the 
influence is quite small for the other groups. Once we 
separate out the three categories, it appears that the mod-
erate and conservative groups of freshmen are less likely 
to vote with the party on procedure, while there is no dif-
ference for the liberal grouping. The effect appears to be 
largest for the conservative group suggesting this crop of 
freshman may be deliberately voting against the rest of 
their party. To summarize, we find that, in general, rank-
and-file members vote with the leadership on procedural 
votes and at even higher rates when the Leader’s office 
sends a signal. However, members who face cross-pres-
sure from their districts are the least responsive to signals 
in what we think is an attempt to keep party support 
scores low and to distance themselves from the 
Democratic Leadership in both style and substance.
Conclusion
In this article, we set out to accomplish three things. First, 
we wanted to document the micro-level role that the 
majority party plays in signaling legislators on how to 
vote on important agenda-setting motions and resolu-
tions. In essence, we are able to verify how the Democratic 
Leadership solves the coordination problem to maintain 
control of the agenda. Although we are continuing to 
learn much about the whip system and its role in positive 
agenda control in Congress (see Evans and Grandy 2009), 
we know significantly less about the influence of party 
leadership prior to substantive votes occurring on the 
floor. In particular, this article has shown that the major-
ity party is cognizant of the balance legislators must 
maintain to get reelected and support the party platform. 
As such, the leadership is more likely to signal positions 
on procedural matters where traceability is much lower 
and the risks to legislators are reduced (Arnold 1990). We 
show here that party leaders are much more likely to sig-
nal their position on certain types of procedural votes—
when winning is essential and when they have the time to 
study the possible substantive changes. If substantive 
outcomes are unclear or if the vote is viewed as less 
essential, the leadership sends signals at much lower 
rates. We think this finding is telling given the emphasis 
prior research has placed on the motion to recommit, 
although our result may be specific to the short time 
where we have data. On other votes such as final passage 
and amendments where traceability is high, the Majority 
Leader offers little guidance to members, and we believe 
this task is left to the formal and informal whip system.
The second goal for this article was to begin to docu-
ment an as yet understudied aspect of the legislative 
process. Prior research has often tried to measure the 
leadership’s position on key votes taken in Congress by 
using various statistical techniques to estimate “ideal 
points” or other positions. We introduce a new dataset 
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that provides a direct measure of the party leadership’s 
position on an important set of votes. The data that we 
use in this article offer a viable, alternative specifica-
tion that is known rather than estimated, and future 
work can use these to tap into the majority’s position on 
some votes taking place in the House. Use of this mea-
sure could be important to students of congressional 
politics seeking to determine the role party plays in 
influencing rank-and-file member behavior on salient 
votes.
Our third and final goal in this article was to apply 
the measure of partisan signaling to the individual deci-
sion-making processes used by rank-and-file legislators. 
Specifically, we wanted to determine what factors led to 
members adopting the majority party’s position. We 
show that while procedural votes may lack traceability, 
party support among the rank-and-file membership is by 
no means assured. Our results echo recent work by 
Minozzi and Volden (2013) suggesting that responsive-
ness to party signals is not simply concentrated among 
majority party moderates; rather, it varies significantly 
across the ideological spectrum of majority party 
members.
In particular, we found that legislator ideology and 
constituency influence were important predictors in this 
decision calculus for some, but not all, members. Liberal 
members supported the leadership at extremely high rates 
across all types of procedural votes and did so nearly per-
fectly when signaled. In contrast, more conservative 
members on the opposite side of the floor median, who 
were generally not needed to obtain a majority on any 
particular vote, supported the party at much lower rates 
on agenda-setting votes and were not responsive to the 
signals. We think these results are important because they 
reinforce the idea that while support for the leadership is 
high, and the majority party is rarely rolled, it does not 
imply that all members toe the party line, even when the 
votes are harder to trace back to substantive changes in 
policy outcomes.
In future research, we think it would be worthwhile to 
examine the effects of defection on procedural votes. A 
cursory examination of the data show some conservative 
Democrats appear to “run away” when the leadership 
sends signals while others toe the line. Through a mix of 
interviews and other methods, we hope to learn if this 
technique is deliberate and if there are any electoral ben-
efits to the strategy. While we only have data for one 
party and for a limited time frame, we could make some 
assumptions and run simulations to estimate results for 
different time periods or for the Republican Party. 
Carrying out these lines of research would allow us to 
learn more about the day-to-day operation of the Congress 
and perhaps how the parties are able to overcome collec-
tive action problems to pass legislation.
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Notes
 1. Platform-type votes include most economic issues—such 
as budgets, social security, and the debt ceiling.
 2. Typically, this will entail arm-twisting, promising favors, 
engaging in vote buying, and whipping recalcitrant mem-
bers on crucial or important votes (see Aldrich and Rohde 
2000).
 3. See, for example, this ad stating Martin Heinrich 
(D-NM) voted with Nancy Pelosi 97 percent of the time 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oLDzo_CvtG0 
accessed 3/23/14) or this ad “Her Congressman” asserting 
Glenn Nye (D-VA) voted with Pelosi 83 percent of the 
time (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pVxOt0NzfGs 
accessed 3/23/14). Jim Marshall (D-GA) went the opposite 
direction, stating he voted with Republican leaders 65 per-
cent of the time (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o03-
dcjNYZA accessed 3/23/14).
 4. H.R. 4853 was originally a short-term extension of the 
Federal Aviation Administration Act. H. Res. 1745 made 
it to agree to a Senate amendment to H.R. 4853 with a 
substitute amendment that inserted the text of H.R. 6467, 
the Middle Class Tax Relief Act of 2010. By using H.R. 
4853 as a vehicle, Democrats allowed majority leader Reid 
to avoid a filibuster on the motion to proceed and allowed 
them to block minority party Republicans from offering a 
motion to recommit (Sloan 2010). An amended version of 
the bill was passed by the Senate, concurred by the House 
and signed into law by the President on December 16, 
2010 (P.L. 111-312).
 5. The majority party likely knows it will be unable to count 
on any minority party support. Even when a special rule is 
comparatively open, the minority is likely to have an addi-
tional amendment it wants considered. For example, on 
March 17, 2009, the House considered H. Res. 250, which 
provided for consideration of the Serve America Act under 
a structured rule. The rule made in order all proposed 
amendments by minority party Republicans. Rep. Lincoln 
Diaz-Balert (R-FL) conceded this point, noting that “I 
know the majority is trumpeting this rule with which we 
bring this underlying legislation to the floor because it will 
allow Members to debate all of the amendments that were 
submitted to the Rules Committee by Republicans. And 
that’s appropriate. Nevertheless, I remind my colleagues 
the majority does this when the underlying legislation is 
uncontroversial” (Congressional Record, 111th Congress, 
March 17, 2009, H3537). Despite this fairly open pro-
cess, Republicans opposed ordering the previous question. 
Rep. Steven LaTourette (R-OH) explained his position: “I 
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intend to vote ‘no’ on the previous question on this par-
ticular rule. I don’t have any big problem with the rule, 
but it is my understanding that Mr. Diaz-Balart will, if it is 
defeated, offer an amendment to the rule that will address 
a topic that isn’t the subject of the GIVE Act, but the AIG 
bonuses” (Congressional Record, 111th Congress, March 
18, 2009, H3540).
 6. Republicans aggressively opposed these rule changes. 
Rules Committee ranking member David Drier (R-CA) 
argued that “process is substance” and noted that the 
Democrats were restricting the one motion that “ensures 
that the minority gets at least one opportunity to offer an 
amendment or an alternative” (Congressional Record, 
111th Congress, January 6, 2009, H6-H20).
 7. In other cases, the motion may not alter the bill in any 
substantial way. For example, in 2009, minority party 
Republicans offered a motion to recommit with instruc-
tions to H.R. 2847, the Commerce-Justice-Science 
Appropriations Act. The bill manager, Rep. David Obey 
(D-WI), responded to the motion by stating, “Do you know 
what [this motion] does? It don’t do nothing. All it does is 
give one of our friends on that side of the aisle a chance to 
talk about an issue. I want to congratulate him. That’s the 
least destructive thing they’ve done today. I simply want to 
say that, if this amendment passes, there is no way it can 
be interpreted by the implementing agency to have any-
thing whatsoever to do with the issue that the gentleman 
just talked about, because the amendment has no effect on 
it” (Congressional Record, 111th Congress, June 18, 2009, 
H7015).
 8. As Mayhew (1974, 99) argues, “There is no member of 
either house who would not be politically injured—by 
being made to toe a party line on all policies (unless of 
course he could determine the line).”
 9. The emails were forwarded to one of the authors on a real-
time basis from a Democratic staff member.
10. We should point out that we cannot provide direct evi-
dence that members are reading these emails and using the 
information to decide how to vote. However, the emails 
are just one of many ways the Majority Leader’s office can 
provide this information and because several go out per 
day, it appears that the office thinks they carry some value. 
In addition to the emails we describe here, the Majority 
Leader also sends out the Weekly and Daily Leader that lay 
out the expected votes for the day or week. These emails 
do not include any instructions. We should also note that 
these emails are both different and separate from the Daily 
and Weekly Whip reports.
11. The PIPC program at Duke University coded the vote 
types for the 110th Congress while the authors coded the 
votes for the 111th Congress.
12. Crespin (2010) finds that representatives are responsive 
to constituents on substantive votes and the party on 
procedure.
13. This happened quite rarely. Either one or both of them 
was absent in just over 4 percent of the observations in 
our dataset. In addition, Hoyer and Clyburn cast opposing 
votes in just over 1 percent of the votes in our dataset. The 
roughly 95 percent of remaining instances saw them pres-
ent and voting in the same direction. In both congresses, 
the leadership’s position matched the signaled position in 
all but one instance (or well over 99% of cases).
14. The generalized linear model (GLM) is more appropri-
ate given the distribution of our dependent variable with 
many cases near 1. Results are similar using ordinary least 
squares (OLS).
15. This means each member is included in the estimate twice 
for each congress. For this reason, we cluster the standard 
errors on each representative, using STATA’s cluster com-
mand. See Froot (1989) and Williams (2000) for more 
details on clustering.
16. Because some members face only token competition in a 
primary, we coded members who received 90 percent or 
more of the primary vote as a zero. Freshmen legislators 
were omitted from this coding.
17. An alternative approach is to interact the group variables 
with the signal variable. In the end, we decided the ease of 
interpretation was worth the decrease in efficiency.
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